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MUELLER v. ALLEN: A CONSTITUTIONAL
CROSSWALK TO FEDERAL TUITION TAX
CREDITS
INTRODUCTION
Quality education for schoolchildren ranks among this nation's top
priorities. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Mueller v. Allen I
and previous case law regarding public aid to private education have
identified certain common concerns of the Court. The current legisla-
tive response to these concerns is Senate Bill 528.2 Labeled the "Edu-
cational Opportunity and Equity Act of 1983," S. 528 would provide a
tax credit to parents who pay tuition to private elementary and secon-
dary schools. While the Minnesota statute3 upheld in Mueller differs
significantly from S. 528, recent first amendment decisions suggest that
the Supreme Court is moving toward a more permissive interpretation
of the Establishment Clause.4 This shift in the Court's interpretation of
the Establishment Clause gives constitutional viability to the Reagan
Administration's tuition tax credit proposal, S. 528.
PRIMARY EFFECT: A HISTORICAL BACKDROP
Examining the Supreme Court's past decisions regarding public aid
to private education illustrates its change in view and indicates its fu-
ture trend regarding public aid to private institutions. To pass constitu-
tional muster, S. 528 must meet the shifting definition of "secular
1. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
2. S. 528, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S1335-38 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1983). The Rea-
gan Administration's bill, was sponsored by Senator Dole (R-Kan.). Co-sponsors of this bi-
partisan bill include Senators Robert Packwood (R-Or.), Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.), Wil-
liam V. Roth, Jr. (R-Del.), Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-N.Y.) and Roger W. Jepsen (R-Iowa).
3. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982) permits a taxpayer to deduct from his or her computation of
gross income the following:
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to exceed
$500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to
12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in attending an ele-
mentary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may legally fulfill the state's com-
pulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivi-
sion, 'textbooks' shall mean and include books and other instructional materials and
equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects
legally and commonly taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state
and shall not include instructional books and materials used in the teaching of reli-
gious tenets, doctrines or worship, nor shall it include such books or materials for, or
transportation to, extracurricular activities including sporting events, musical or dra-
matic events, speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar nature.
4. The Establishment Clause of the Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
Journal of Legislation
effect." The Court defined "secular effect" in Lemon v. Kurtzman5 as
containing three elements:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968);
finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entangle-
ment" with religion.6
The Supreme Court has placed varying degrees of emphasis on these
elements.7
Opponents of tuition tax credit legislation argue that legislation au-
thorizing tuition tax credits violates the Constitution since the Supreme
Court in an earlier decision, Committee for Public Education and Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist,8 struck down a statute authorizing financial
aid programs for non-public elementary and secondary schools. The
New York statute provided for the following:
1) direct grants to "qualifying" non-public schools to ensure the
health, welfare and safety of enrolled students through maintenance
and repair of school facilities and equipment;9 2) a tuition reimburse-
ment plan for parents with an annual income of less than $5,000 whose
children attend non-public elementary or secondary schools;' and
3) tax relief for parents who did not qualify for the reimbursement
plan. 1
The Supreme Court found that these New York programs violated
the second prong of the Lemon test because they advanced religion.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, emphasized that the effect of
the maintenance and repair provisions and the reimbursement plan
was "unmistakenly to provide desired financial support for nonpublic,
sectarian institutions."12 Moreover, the Court held that although the
reimbursement grants went directly to the parents rather than the
schools, aid to religion was not attenuated.
Furthermore, the Court found the New York tax relief plan, estab-
lished to benefit parents who did not qualify for the reimbursement
plan, suspect because the tax deduction was wholly unrelated to the
dollar amount the parent actually expended for tuition.' 3 While the
statute was intended to provide each family with a carefully estimated
net benefit comparable to the tuition grant accorded lower income fam-
ilies, it actually granted middle income parents tuition grants thinly
5. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. Id. at 612-613.
7. As Justice Powell pointed out in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973), the elements set
out in Lemon are "no more than helpful signposts."
8. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
9. N.Y. EDUC. LAW. §§ 549-553 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
10. Id §§ 559-563 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
11. N.Y. TAx LAW § 612(j) (McKinney 1975).
12. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783.
13. Id. at 790.
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disguised as a tax benefit. 14 The Court held, in effect, that any state aid
to private schools or to parents of private schoolchildren ultimately
benefited religious schools and resulted in an unconstitutional advance-
ment of religion.
Prior to Nyquist, the Supreme Court had applied the "primary secu-
lar effect" test in analyzing the constitutionality of a statute. Under the
"primary secular effect" criteria, legislation would not be deemed to
contravene the Establishment Clause as long as the legislation had a
"primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."' 5 As late
as 1971, the Court reiterated its application of the primary secular ef-
fect test. In Tilton v. Richardson,6 the Court upheld construction
grants to religious colleges, emphasizing that:
[t]he simplistic argument that every form of financial aid to church-
sponsored activity violates the Religion Clauses was rejected long ago
in Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). . . .The crucial question
is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a conse-
quence of the legislative program, but whether its principal orprimary
effect advances religion.'
In Nyquist, however, the Supreme Court radically departed from
the "primary secular effect" test and adopted an "any effects" test.18
Justice Powell maintained that, "our [previous] cases simply do not
support the notion that a law found to have a 'primary' effect to pro-
mote some legitimate end under the State's [sic] police power is im-
mune from further examination to ascertain whether it also has the
direct and immediate effect of advancing religion."' 19 Thus, under the
Nyquist rationale, legislation which met the "primary secular effect"
test might still be deemed unconstitutional if the legislation had any
effect of advancing religion.2"
Moreover, the Court applied the "any effects" test in Meek v. Pit-
tenger ,21 and held provisions of a Pennsylvania statute authorizing
14. Thus, a parent who earned less than $5,000 was entitled to a tuition reimbursement of $50 for
a child attending an elementary nonpublic school, while a parent who earned over $5,000 but
less than $9,000 was entitled to an equivalent tax deduction. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 790.
15. School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
16. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
17. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
18. See Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, 302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975), where the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a state statute
authorizing tuition tax credits for parents of children attending nonpublic elementary or sec-
ondary schools. Looking to Nyquist, the Minnesota Court emphasized that "[in applying
the 'primary effects test', we must be guided by the realization . . . that this is no longer a
primary effects test, but an 'any effects' test." Id. at 232, 224 N.w.2d at 353 (emphasis
added).
19. 413 U.S. at 783 n.39.
20. Young and Tigges, Federal Tuition Tax Credits and the Establishment Clause: A Constiu-
tionalAnalysis, 28 CATH. LAW. 35, 42 (1983). Prior to the Mueller decision Young and Tig-
ges acknowledged the Court's shifting definition of secular effect.
21. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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loans to schools for instructional materials and equipment
unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, this test did not survive. Two years later, in Wolman
v. Walter,22 the Court began to "whittle away" at the Nyquist-Meek
"any effects" test. In Wolman v. Walter the Court struck down provi-
sions of an Ohio statute authorizing loans of instructional materials
and equipment to nonpublic schools. The portions of the statute that
provided for furnishing textbooks, standardized testing services, and
diagnostic and therapeutic services to nonpublic schoolchildren were
deemed constitutional.23 The Ohio statute bore a striking resemblance
to the Pennsylvania statute invalidated in Meek, yet their outcomes dif-
fered. The disparity in their outcomes illustrates the Court's movement
away from the "any effects" test.
The Court's movement away from the "any effects" test flourished
in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan.24
The Regan decision upheld a New York statute authorizing the use of
state funds to reimburse nonpublic schools for costs incurred in ad-
ministering state-required tests. Although the reimbursement plan pro-
vided a direct and immediate benefit to sectarian schools that would
have violated the "any effects" standard set forth in Nyquist, the direct
aid to sectarian schools was not deemed unconstitutional.25 Thus, Re-
gan marked the Court's return to the "primary secular" effect test. As
this line of cases illustrates, the Supreme Court has undergone a dra-
matic shift regarding public assistance to private education.26 The
Court's increasingly tolerant attitude toward public aid to nonpublic
schools set the stage for the recent Mueller v. Allen decision.
THE MUELLER v. ALLEN DECISION
Mueller v. Allen27 sustained a Minnesota statute authorizing a state
income tax deduction to parents for "tuition, textbooks and transporta-
tion" costs that their dependents incur while attending elementary or
secondary schools. The statute permits parents of either public or pri-
22. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
23. Id.
24. 444 U.S. 646 (1980). Ironically, the author of the majority opinion, Justice White, was the
vehement dissenter in Nyquist.
25. Id. at 661-662.
26. As the majority in Regan noted:
This is not to say that this case, any more than past cases, will furnish a litmus-paper
test to distinguish permissible from impermissible aid to religiously oriented schools
.... What is certain is that our decisions have tended to avoid categorical impera-
tives and absolutist approaches at either end of the range of possible outcomes. This
course sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility, but this promises to be the
case until the continuing interaction between the courts and the States--the former
charged with interpreting and upholding the Constitution and the latter seeking to
provide education for their youth-produces a single, more encompassing construc-
tion of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 662.
27. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
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vate schoolchildren to take the deduction, but it does not allow any
parent to take a deduction for textbooks used in teaching religious doc-
trines. Nor does the statute allow deductions for expenses children in-
cur by participating in extracurricular activities.28 In sustaining the
Minnesota statute, the Mueller Court used the three-prong test en-
nunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman .29 The first prong of the Lemon test,
"secular effect," and the third prong, "excessive entanglement," met lit-
tle resistance from the Court, whereas the second prong, "primary ef-
fect," posed serious constitutional questions.
In Mueller, the Court dismissed arguments concerning the Minne-
sota statute's secular purpose. The Court admitted its "reluctance to
attribute unconstitutional motives to the states, particularly when a
plausible secular purpose for the state's program may be discerned
from the face of the statute."30 The valid secular purposes the Court
discerned from the face of the Minnesota statute included: the neces-
sity of a well-educated populace, regardless of who educates them; the
continued health of private schools relieving the public schools of the
added burden of educating a substantial number of children, to the
benefit of all taxpayers; and the preservation of private schools as a
28. Both the district court and the court of appeals found that the Minnesota statute permitted a
deduction for a range of educational expenses. The district court found that deductible ex-
penses included:
I. Tuition in the ordinary sense.
2. Tuition to public school students who attend public schools outside their resi-
dence school districts.
3. Certain summer school tuition.
4. Tuition charged by a school for slow learner private tutoring services.
5. Tuition for instruction provided by an elementary or secondary school to students
who are physically unable to attend classes at such schools.
6. Tuition charged by a private tutor or by a school that is not an elementary or
secondary school if the instruction is acceptable for credit in an elementary or
secondary school.
7. Montessori School tuition for grades K through 12.
8. Tuition for driver education when it is part of the school curriculum.
Mueller, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (1981). The court of appeals concurred in this finding.
In addition, the district court found that the statutory deduction for "textbooks" included
not only "secular textbooks" but also:
I. Cost of tennis shoes and sweatsuits for physical education.
2. Camera rental fees paid to the school for photography classes. [sic]
3. Ice skates rental fee paid to the school.
4. Rental fee paid to the school for calculators for mathematics classes.
5. Costs of home economics materials needed to meet minimum requirements.
6. Costs of special metal or wood needed to meet minimum requirements of shop
classes.
7. Costs of supplies needed to meet minimum requirements of art classes.
8. Rental fees paid to the school for musical instruments.
9. Cost of pencils and special notebooks required for class.
Id The court of appeals accepted this finding. Mueller, 676 F.2d 1195, 1196 (1982).
29. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Admittedly, the majority in Mueller cautioned that previous cases have
rendered the Lemon test less important. This caveat is crucial to understanding the Court's
willingness to apply alternative standards to problems involving the Establishment Clause.
Marsh v. Chambers, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), illustrates the Court's application of
alternative standards. In Marsh, the Court focused on the Nebraska legislature's tradition of
opening each legislative session with a prayer said by a state-paid chaplin, and totally ig-
nored the Lemon test.
30. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3066.
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"benchmark" for public schools.3'
Addressing the second prong of the Lemon test, the Court con-
cluded that the Minnesota statute had a primary secular effect.32 First,
and most importantly, the Minnesota statute was merely a single tax
deduction in an overall comprehensive tax scheme. Legislatures tradi-
tionally have been given broad discretion in their formation of tax stat-
utes.3 3 Therefore, the Court hesitated to find this tax deduction
unconstitutional.
Second, in addressing the second prong of the Lemon test, the Muel-
ler Court noted that the parent rather than the school claimed the de-
duction. The Court found the position of the parent as an independent
decision-maker constitutionally significant. Under this "arrangement
public funds become available only as a result of numerous, private
choices of individual parents of school-age children. ' 34 The insulating
effect of the parent prevents the conferral of the "imprimatur of State
approval. ' 35 This contention directly contradicts Nyquist in which the
Court viewed parents as a mere conduit for direct aid to religious
schools.36 In Mueller, the parents, as the direct recipients of the aid, act
as a buffer separating church and state.
This attenuated financial benefit to the sectarian schools avoids the
evils the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent. The Nyquist
3 1. The Court in Mueller stated:
Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an educa-
tional alternative for millions of young Americans; they often afford wholesome com-
petition with our public schools; and in some States they relieve substantially the tax
burden incident to the operation of public schools. The State has, moreover, a legiti-
mate interest in facilitating education of the highest quality for all children within its
boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen for them.
Id. at 3067, (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262) (Powell, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
32. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. 3071.
33. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002
(1983), which quoted with approval Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88, (1940) (foot-
notes omitted) and stated:
The broad discretion as to classification possessed by a legislature in the field of
taxation has long been recognized. . . . The passage of time has only served to un-
derscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed
by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. Traditionally classification has
been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and usages in order to achieve an
equitable distribution of the tax burden. It has, because of this, been pointed out that
in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in
classification. Since the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with
local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality
can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a
hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. The bur-
den is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it.
The majority in Nyquist did not defer to the New York Legislature since the Court failed to
recognize the statute as a legitimate tax measure. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 790, n.49 (1973).
34. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069.
35. Id. at 3069, (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 at 275 (1981)). As Justice Rehnquist
observed in Mueller, the Nyquist Court agreed that the beneficiary to whom the benefits were
to flow is a material consideration in their analysis of the Establishment Clause.
36. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 791.
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majority was concerned that government involvement in religious edu-
cation would "strain a political system to the breaking point."37 The
Mueller majority, however, did not find this argument persuasive. As
the Court points out:
At this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the
dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment
Clause in the Bill of Rights. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
668 [90 S. Ct. 1409, 1411, 25 L. Ed. 2d 697] (1970). The risk of signifi-
cant religious or denominational control over our democratic
processes-or even of deep political division along religious lines-is
remote, and when viewed against the positive contributions of sectar-
ian schools, and [sic] such risk seems entirely tolerable in light of the
continuing oversight of this Court. 38
With time, the risk of religious control over our democratic processes
has dissipated.
The Court did not consider the "direct and immediate" effect of the
Minnesota statute on religion in the Mueller decision. In fact, the
Court concedes that "financial assistance provided to parents ulti-
mately has an economic effect comparable to that of aid given directly
to the schools attended by their children. ' 39 This "direct and immedi-
ate" aid to religious schools is precisely the type of aid that the Nyquist
Court abhorred.4" Thus, the Mueller Court considered conferral of
substantial benefits upon religious institutions an insufficient reason for
declaring the Minnesota statute unconstitutional.4
Third, the Mueller Court relied on the availability of the deduction
to all parents. The Court did not assert, however, that the availability
to all parents was essential to constitutionality. Furthermore, the Court
rejected a statistical analysis of beneficiaries. Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the majority, declared, "We would be loath to adopt a rule
grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual re-
ports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens
claimed benefits under the law."42 Therefore, a statute's constitutional-
ity hinges not on a statistical analysis but upon whether it provides
benefits to a broad spectrum of groups. "[Tihe provision of benefits to
so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular
effect."43
The third prong of the Lemon test, excessive entanglement, did not
37. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069 (quoting Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 796 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'ns, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970))).
38. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069 (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 263 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
39. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069.
40. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783, n.39.
41. The Mueller Court found that the Minnesota statute did not have "the primary effect of
advancing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools." 103 S. Ct. at 3067 (quoting Commit-
tee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980)). This language supports the
earlier proposition that the Court has returned to its application of the "primary effect" test.
42. 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
43. Id. at 3068, (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 274 (1981)).
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trouble the Mueller Court. The Court's only concern was "whether
particular textbooks qualify for a deduction."" Since Minnesota stat-
ute section 290.09(22) does not allow a deduction for textbooks and
instructional materials used to teach religion, state officials were re-
quired to determine which textbooks would qualify for the deduction.
The Court found that this determination did not excessively entangle
church and state.45
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL: SENATE BILL 528
The Mueller decision lays a constitutional foundation for the Rea-
gan Administration bill, S. 528. The bill amends the Internal Revenue
Code to permit an individual taxpayer to claim a credit of fifty percent
of the tuition paid to full-time private primary or secondary schools.
46
Additionally, the bill allows a taxpayer to claim a maximum credit of
$100 in 1983, $200 in 1984, and $300 in 1985 and subsequent years.47
The tax credit, however, would be reduced for families with adjusted
gross income exceeding $40,000 ($20,000 for married individuals filing
separately) and would be eliminated for families whose adjusted gross
income exceeds $50,000.48
In Nyquist, the Court determined that the Constitution recognizes
no significant difference between a tax credit and a tax deduction.4 9
Generally, a tax credit is an amount which is subtracted from the com-
puted tax itself, in contrast to a deduction which is generally subtracted
from gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income or taxable in-
come. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Nyquist, stated:
We see no reason to select one label over another, as the constitutional-
ity of this hybrid benefit does not turn in any event on the label we
accord it. As Mr. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 614, notes, constitutional analysis is
not a "legalistic minuet in which precise rules and forms must govern."
Instead we must "examine the form of the relationship for the light
44. 103 S. Ct. at 3071. The Minnesota statute defines "textbooks" as:
books and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and secon-
dary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught in public
elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include instructional
books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the
purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship, nor shall it include
such books or materials for, or transportation to, extracurricular activities, driver's
education, or programs of a similar nature.
Minn. Stat. § 290.09(22) (1982).
45. In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Supreme Court upheld the loan of
secular textbooks to parents of children attending nonpublic schools, although state officials
determined whether particular books were secular. This process, similar to the one em-
ployed in Mueller, was held not to violate the Establishment Clause.
46. S. 528, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 441(a),(b)(1)(C) (1983), 129 CONG. REc. S1335-36, § 44H(a),
(b)(I)(C) (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1983).
47. Id. § 441(b).
48. Id.
49. 413 U.S. at 790 n.49.
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 331 (5th ed. 1979).
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that it casts on the substance.'
The Nyquist Court reserved the question of whether a "genuine tax
deduction" would be constitutionally acceptable. 2 The Mueller Court
addressed this question, and held that a tax deduction is constitution-
ally permissible. 3
Similar to the tax deduction allowed by the Minnesota statute in
Mueller, S. 528 contains tax credit provisions directly related to the
amounts parents actually spend on tuition.54 Therefore, S. 528 avoids
the pitfall of Nyquist in which the Court deemed unconstitutional a
reimbursement plan unrelated to the amount of tuition paid by par-
ents.55 Unlike the New York statute in Nyquist, S. 528 does not conceal
an outright grant under the guise of a tax refund.
An amendment to S. 528 proposes to add a refundability provision
allowing low income parents who incur little or no income tax liability
to receive a payment equal to the amount of the unused credit.5 6 This
refundability amendment resembles the reimbursement plan struck
down in Nyquist. Thus, addition of this amendment would place S. 528
in constitutional jeopardy.
The final substantive difference between S. 528 and the Minnesota
deduction permitted in Mueller lies in the breadth of the class benefit-
ted. The Minnesota statute allowed all taxpayers with children in pub-
lic or private schools a deduction, whereas S. 528 authorizes a credit to
all tuition-paying taxpayers with children in private schools.57 Thus, S.
528 raises the crucial question of whether it is facially neutral over a
broad spectrum of groups. Although the bill identifies a different class
of beneficiaries than the Minnesota statute, this difference is not neces-
sarily fatal to the bill's constitutionality. The Mueller decision did not
hinge upon the inclusion of all parents as beneficiaries. Rather, the
Court focused upon the breadth of the class benefitted and other fac-
tors as elements essential to constitutionality. These elements distin-
guished Mueller from Nyquist and contributed to the Court's finding
the Minnesota plan constitutional.58
The Mueller Court held that the Minnesota statute accorded a tax
deduction to a sufficiently broad spectrum of people.59 Senate Bill 528
applies to an equally broad spectrum of people. Private school parents
benefitted by S. 528 include taxpayers motivated by their diverse be-
liefs and a desire to provide quality education for their children. Of the
approximately eleven percent of American elementary and secondary
51. 413 U.S. at 789.
52. Id. at 790, n.49.
53. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3067, n.6.
54. S. 528, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 441(a) (1983), 129 CONG. REC. S1335-36, § 44H(a) (daily ed.
Feb. 17, 1983).
55. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756.
56. R. Lyke, update of CRS Report Issue Brief IB81075, Tuition Tax Credits 5 (Aug. 1, 1983).
57. S. 528, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(a) and § 441(d)(13)(B) (1983).
58. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3067-69.
59. Id. at 3069.
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schoolchildren attending private schools,6" sixteen percent attend non-
sectarian schools.6 1 Thus, S. 528 benefits a broader spectrum of taxpay-
ers than merely those who enroll their children in religious-affiliated
schools.
Although the Mueller Court was reluctant to rely on a statistical
analysis to determine the constitutionality of a statute that applies to all
public and private school parents, a statistical analysis is necessary to
determine the breadth of the class benefitted by a statute that applies
only to private school parents. As the Mueller dissent points out, the
Minnesota statute overwhelmingly benefits parents of children in pri-
vate schools.62 Therefore, the constitutionality of S. 528 should not
hinge on whether its tax benefits flow to all parents with
schoolchildren.
Furthermore, S. 528 should not be found unconstitutional since in
previous cases involving the Establishment Clause, such as Everson,63
Allen,' 4 and Wolman,65 the Supreme Court held state programs that
solely benefitted private schoolchildren constitutional. Seemingly, if a
state statute which solely applies to private schoolchildren can be ad-
judged constitutional, a federal statute aimed at private school parents
nationwide must be constitutional as well.
Moreover, deference to Congress has historically influenced judicial
decision. As the Supreme Court has noted:
The customary deference accorded the judgments of Congress is cer-
tainly appropriate when. . . Congress specifically consider[s] the ques-~66
tion of the Act's constitutionality.
60. Congressionally Mandated Study of School Finance, A Final Report to Congress from the Sec-
retary ofEducation, 2 PRIVATE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION i (1983).
61. Id. at 6.
62. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3074. As the dissent emphasized:
Contrary to the majority's suggestion, the bulk of the tax benefits afforded by the
Minnesota scheme are enjoyed by parents of parochial school children not because
parents of public school children fail to claim deductions to which they are entitled,
but because the latter are simply unable to claim the largest tax deduction that Min-
nesota authorizes. Fewer than 100 of more than 900,000 school-age children in Min-
nesota attend public schools that charge a general tuition. Of the total number of
taxpayers who are eligible for the tuition deduction, approximately 96% send their
children to religious schools. Parents who send their children to free public schools
are simply ineligible to obtain the full benefit of the deduction except in the unlikely
event that they buy $700 worth of pencils, notebooks, and bus rides for their school-
age children. Yet parents who pay at least $700 in tuition to nonpublic sectarian
schools can claim the full deduction even if they incur no other educational expenses.
Id. at 3074.
63. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
64. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
65. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
66. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981), where the Court stated:
The Congress is a coequal branch of government whose Members take the same oath
we do to uphold the Constitution of the United States. As Justice Frankfurter noted
in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951) (concur-
ring opinion), we must have "due regard to the fact that this Court is not exercising a
primary judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath
to observe the Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on
government."
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Given the broad spectrum which S. 528 encompasses, the Constitution
does not require extension of the tax benefit to parents who pay tuition
to public schools.67
The Mueller Court did not consider excessive entanglement, the
third prong of the Lemon test, a major factor in its decision. Since S.
528 and Mueller both involve tax measures, excessive entanglement
should not command the Court's attention with regard to S. 528. Gen-
erally, a comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveil-
lance constitutes excessive entanglement.68 Senate Bill 528 does not
encourage such surveillance.
The anti-discrimination provisions in S. 528, however, should be
analyzed as to whether they excessively entangle church and state.
These provisions give the Attorney General authority to ensure that tax
credits are not taken by parents with children attending racially dis-
criminatory schools. Furthermore, S. 528 provides the Attorney Gen-
eral with standards by which to determine whether a school violates the
anti-discrimination provisions. The Court's decisions in Bob Jones
University v. United States69 and Committeefor Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Regan7" do not indicate that merely vesting en-
Id. at 64.
67. Senator David Durenberger (R-Minn.) plans to offer an amendment extending the tax bene-
fit of S. 528 to parents who pay tuition to public schools. This amendment is not necessary
for S. 528 to pass muster because the Administration bill already applies to a broad enough
spectrum of individuals.
68. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3071, (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
69. In Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), the Court upheld the Inter-
nal Revenue Service's revocation of the University's tax exempt status because of its racially
discriminatory standards. This resulted from a thorough investigation by the IRS into the
admission policies of this private university. Since the Court sanctioned such activity with-
out raising the issue of excessive entanglement, it appears that the section in S. 528 authoriz-
ing the Attorney General to enforce anti-discrimination provisions does not constitute
excessive entanglement.
70. The Mueller opinion gave little consideration to the third prong of the Lemon test, excessive
entanglement. The Minnesota tax deduction deserved no more attention because the only
question it presented was whether the state was excessively entangled in church affairs when
it determines the secular content of books that parents buy for use at sectarian schools and
then claim a deduction for the purchase price on their personal income tax forms. It has
been suggested that S. 528 may raise the excessive entanglement issue because the bill autho-
rizes the Attorney General to seek a declaratory judgment against any private school which
practices racial discrimination. (See S. 528 § 4, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REC. S1335,
1337 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1983)).
This declaratory judgment would deny a tuition tax credit to the parents of children
attending such a school. The Attorney General may initiate this process either upon his
receipt of an allegation of discrimination filed against an institution or upon the Attorney
General's finding of good cause. Although these methods may require contact someday be-
tween the Attorney General and private sectarian schools, these provisions do not excessively
entangle church and state. Under the first method, the Administration bill defines "allega-
tions of discrimination" and gives a detailed procedure for the Attorney General to follow in
his actions against a school. As the Court has observed in Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660 (1980), a "process (which) is straightfor-
ward and susceptible to . . . routinization" does not on its face suggest excessive entangle-
ment and the Court is not prepared to read into such a statute as inevitable "the bad faith
upon which any future excessive entanglement would be predicated." Id. at 660. However,
the second method, triggered by the Attorney General's finding of good cause, is not so
detailed. The bill does not define "good cause" nor does it prescribe how the Attorney Gen-
eral shall arrive at such a determination. Nonetheless, in leaving such matters to the Attor-
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forcement authority in the Attorney General and prescribing required
procedures by which to examine discrimination will excessively entan-
gle church and state.
CONCLUSION
Numerous factors will play a role in the determination of the con-
stitutionality of S. 528. Considering these factors, this bill would sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny. First, it is a legitimate tax measure
conferring benefits upon a broad spectrum of groups with a valid secu-
lar purpose, that of advancing educational opportunity. Second, as
Mueller v. Allen illustrates, the Supreme Court has adopted a more per-
missive attitude regarding separation of church and state. Third, the
Court has shown a willingness to tolerate a greater degree of govern-
ment involvement in private education. Therefore, S. 528 should pass
constitutional review.
Proponents of S. 528 should not deliberate over amendments that
do not bolster its constitutionality. Rather, they should advance the
bill to enactment.71 Preserving parental choice and enhancing educa-
tional opportunity are common goals of all Americans.
Abe L. Frank*
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Ann L. VanderLaan*
ney General's discretion, the bill does not engender excessive entanglement. In NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), the Supreme Court declined to read into a
federal statute an unconstitutionally broad authority in "the absence of a clear expression of
Congress' intent" to intrude upon areas protected by the first amendment Religion Clauses.
Id. at 507. Since Congress did not set forth such a clear expression of intent, S. 528 does not
excessively entangle the state in church affairs.
71. Shortly after the authors completed this note, S. 528 was defeated in the United States Senate
by a vote of 59 to 38, 129 CONG. REG. S16269, S16300 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1983).
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